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In the size-weight illusion (SWI), small objects feel heavier
than larger objects of the same mass. This effect is typically
thought to be a consequence of the lifter’s expectation
that the large object will outweigh the small object,
because objects of the same type typically get heavier as
they get larger. Here, we show that this perceptual effect
can occur across object category, where there are no
strong expectations about the correspondence between
size and mass. One group of participants lifted samecolored large and small cubes with the same mass as one
another, while another group lifted differently-colored
large and small cubes with the same mass as one another.
The group who lifted the same-colored cubes experienced
a robust SWI and initially lifted the large object with more
force than the small object. By contrast, the group who
lifted the different-colored objects did so with equal initial
forces on the first trial, but experienced just as strong an
illusion as those who lifted the same-colored objects.
These results demonstrate that color cues can selectively
influence the application of fingertip force rates while not
impacting at all upon the lifter’s perception of object
weight, highlighting a stark dissociation in how prior
information affects perception and action.

Introduction
The perception of object weight has a long history of
study (Weber, Ross, & Murray, 1996). In the past

# $

century, however, it has been established that one’s
experience of how heavy something feels is far from
veridical. For example, individuals will consistently
have their perception of object weight biased by
irrelevant properties, such as object size. This effect is
known as the ‘‘size-weight illusion’’ (SWI), and
manifests as the consistent percept that large objects
feel lighter than smaller objects of the same mass
(Charpentier, 1891). Although the full-strength SWI
requires haptic feedback of object size, a robust illusion
can be experienced with visual cues alone (Ellis &
Lederman, 1993). This effect has been demonstrated in
a diverse range of individuals, from those with brain
injury (Buckingham, Bieńkiewicz, Rohrbach, &
Hermsdörfer, 2015; Li, Randerath, Goldenberg, &
Hermsdörfer, 2011) to individuals with sensory deﬁcits
(Buckingham, Milne, Byrne, & Goodale, 2015; Ellis &
Lederman, 1993) to young children (Pick & Pick, 1967).
Because the SWI is so powerful and ubiquitous,
numerous studies over the past century have attempted
to shed light on the evolutionary underpinnings and the
physiological mechanisms behind this effect. Initially, it
was presumed that the illusion has a sensorimotor
origin, with the perception of object weight reﬂecting a
mismatch between the expected and actual force
requirements of lifting the differently-sized objects
(Davis & Roberts, 1976). However, a landmark study
by Flanagan and Beltzner (2000) rendered this explanation untenable. When examining ﬁngertip force rates
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applied to SWI-inducing objects on a trial-by-trial
basis, they noted that, although participants did grip
and lift the large objects with a higher rate of force than
they used with the small object on the ﬁrst trial, these
expectation-driven ‘‘errors’’ were rapidly corrected.
Yet, in spite of the rapid adaptation of the ﬁngertip
forces, the magnitude of the perceptual illusion
remained unchanged, suggesting that SWI must be
independent from sensorimotor prediction. This ﬁnding
led the authors to suggest that, in contrast to the
rapidly-adapting ‘‘expectations,’’ which underpin sensorimotor prediction, the SWI must reﬂect stable and
long-lasting cognitive/perceptual expectations. Although both sensorimotor and cognitive priors appear
to be derived from the strong positive correlation
between the size and volume of objects we encounter in
our environment, their different rates of adaptation
suggest they must be independent from one another.
Perhaps the strongest support to date for the role of
cognitive priors as a causal mechanism underpinning
the SWI comes from a follow-up study by Flanagan,
Bittner, and Johansson (2008). In their study, the
authors allowed groups of individuals to interact with a
range of objects, which had an inverted density (i.e.,
where the large objects were less heavy than the small
objects), prior to lifting identically-weighted objects of
difference sizes. Groups who received a moderate
amount of experience with these inverse-density objects
experienced a smaller SWI than individuals who did
not experience these inverse objects. And, most
tellingly, groups who experienced the inverse-density
objects thousands of times over the course of multiple
days experienced an inverted SWI, reporting that the
small object felt less heavy than the large, identicallyweighted object.
This ‘‘cognitive/perceptual expectation’’ explanation
for the SWI has been challenged by scientists who have
proposed instead that the illusion reﬂects the detection
of a more ecologically relevant property than mass such
as density (Grandy & Westwood, 2006; Ross & Di
Lollo, 1970), inertia tensor (Amazeen & Turvey, 1996;
Oberle & Amazeen, 2003; Wagman, Zimmerman, &
Sorric, 2007), or throwability (Zhu & Bingham, 2011;
Zhu, Shockley, Riley, Tolston, & Bingham, 2013).
Nevertheless, a growing body of work suggests that
prior expectations must inﬂuence weight perception to
some degree. Strong evidence for the role of cognitive/
perceptual expectations in weight perception comes
from a range of other weight illusions, which are
induced without variations in object size. The most
famous of these is the ‘‘material-weight illusion
(MWI),’’ where objects which appear to be made from
a low-density material (e.g., polystyrene) feel heavier
than identically-weighted objects, which appear to be
made from metal or other high-density materials
(Buckingham, Cant, & Goodale, 2009; Buckingham,
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Ranger, & Goodale, 2011; Ellis & Lederman, 1999;
Seashore, 1899). Perhaps the clearest demonstration of
a top-down weight illusion comes from Ellis and
Lederman (1998), who had expert golfers and nongolfers compare the weight of practice and real golf
balls, which had been adjusted to weigh the same
amount as one another. The expert golfers, who had
clear prior expectations that the practice golf ball
should be lighter than the real golf ball, experienced
that the practice ball felt heavier than the real ball. By
contrast, the nongolfer group, who had no prior
expectations relating to the practice and real golf balls,
experienced no weight illusion whatsoever, reporting
that the balls felt the same weight as one another.
Direct support for the role of prior expectations in the
SWI comes from a study showing that the SWI can be
induced in a single object. Buckingham and Goodale
(2010a) had blindfolded participants lift and judge the
weight of a single, unchanging object over multiple
trials, while varying the size of the object they saw in a
brief preview period before each lift. When participants
saw a large object, they reported that the lifted object
felt lighter than it did when they saw a small object
prior to the lift, experiencing a robust SWI in a
situation where only their expectations were manipulated from trial to trial.
Although it seems reasonably uncontentious that
long-held prior expectations can inﬂuence weight
perception in the context of the MWI, it is far from
clear what body of information the SWI-inducing prior
is drawn from. For one, given that the objects lifted in
typical SWI paradigms often are made from materials
which do not give a clear indication of their density
(e.g., plastic), one tacit assumption is that the SWI
stems from recent experiences with the other stimuli in
the set. For example, the smallest object of a set will
feel comparatively heavy because of participants’
experiences with the larger object lifted on earlier trials.
By contrast, in the MWI and other such paradigms,
participants are unlikely to be experiencing a comparison to earlier lifts, but to their long-held ideas of how
much a particular material should weigh. Of course, in
the real world, both of these types of prior expectations
are likely to both play a role in how heavy an object
feels, as an object’s density will govern how its mass
relates to size. Given that it takes a substantial amount
of perceptual learning to alter the magnitude of the
SWI, Flanagan et al. (2008) suggest that the perceptual
effect reﬂects slowly-adapting priors, which are based
on entire families of objects (e.g., all objects of a
particular type, which are likely to have approximately
the same density, such as all types of books). In other
words, the SWI may reﬂect the way in which our
perceptual system ﬂags objects, which have a particularly high or low density for their type. This suggestion
is appealing on several grounds, not the least of which
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such a mechanism would have a clear ecological
purpose such as signaling that a particular fruit might
not yet be ripe or that a wooden log might be too wet to
use as ﬁrewood. However, recent ﬁndings have
questioned this hypothesis.
Buckingham and Goodale (2013) had participants
lift and judge the weight of large and small cubes,
which appeared to be made from different materials
(metal and polystyrene), but which had all been
adjusted to weigh the same amount as one another. The
prediction was that, if the SWI reﬂected deviations
from the usual size-weight mappings of different
families of objects, the more dense-looking stimuli
should induce a stronger SWI because participants
would expect the large metal cube object to far
outweigh the small metal cube. By contrast, the objects
that appeared to be made from a low-density material
should induce a far smaller illusion, because participants would expect the large polystyrene cube to
outweigh its small counterpart by only a few grams.
Surprisingly, however, participants’ expectations of
heaviness for the small and large exemplars of each
material were unrelated to their subsequent perceptions
of heaviness; both the metal and the polystyrene cubes
induced robust weight illusions in both conditions,
which were of equal magnitude to one another. In other
words, the SWI experienced for one type of object was
invariant, and not speciﬁc to that category of object,
suggesting that the illusion reﬂected a contrast with a
more general, broader, prior expectation. The Buckingham and Goodale (2013) study, however, cannot
offer a complete rejection of the proposal that the SWI
reﬂects a contrast to the lifter’s prior expectations. For
one thing, even though participants had clear prior
expectations about how heavy each object would be, it
is not clear whether the prior expectations for each
material were of equal reliability (if, for example, one
type of material is assumed to be hollow more often
than the other). Furthermore, all the participants lifted
each type of object multiple times in the same session,
which may have biased the perceptual ratings given on
each trial toward the mean.
To examine how prior information inﬂuences weight
perception in a more controlled manner, and to gain
insight into exactly what visual cues are diagnostic of
objects being within the same category or family as one
another, we tested separate groups of participants on a
SWI task. One group performed a traditional SWI
task—lifting and judging the weight of large and small
cubes with identical mass that were the same color as
one another. Participants in this group would presumably expect the objects to be from the same family (i.e.,
have the same density) and, after lifting the small cube,
should form strong expectations that the large cube will
be heavier. A second group also lifted similar identicalmass cubes, but here the large cube was a different
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color from the small cube. If simple color cues are
sufﬁcient to distinguish one object as being categorically different from another object, it is likely that
individuals in this latter group would have no reason to
expect the objects to have the same density as one
another and should have no reason to assume that the
large cube will be heavier than the recently-lifted small
cube (at least, not to the same degree as individuals
lifting objects of the same color). Thus, if short-term
expectations that are speciﬁc to a particular type of
object do play a causal role in the SWI, people lifting
objects that differ in size and color should experience a
smaller SWI and show less-robust sensorimotor prediction than when lifting objects that vary only in their
size. If, however, differences in color between differently-sized, otherwise similar-looking objects are not
cues utilized by the perceptual or sensorimotor systems
to distinguish between object categories, then we would
expect both groups to show similar weight illusions and
ﬁngertip force scaling.

Method
Participants
We recruited a total of 72 participants (23 male, 49
female; mean age ¼ 19.9 years 6 1.9 years) for the
experiment, and randomly assigned 36 to a Same-Color
stimulus group (hereafter ‘‘Same’’) and 36 to a
Different-Color group (hereafter ‘‘Different’’). Most
participants self-reported that they were right-handed
(64 versus 8), and all were screened against a history of
neurological or motor disturbances. Participants all
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants gave informed consent to participate in the
study, and all procedures were approved by the
Dalhousie University Research Ethics Board.

Materials
Four wooden cubes were created for this experiment,
two large (9.3 cm 3 9.3 cm 3 9.3 cm) and two small (7.4
cm 3 7.4 cm 3 7.4 cm), all having a mass of 400 g
(Figure 1A). Densities were 0.5 g/cm3 for the large cube
and 1.0 g/cm3 for the small cube. One cube of each size
was painted red and one cube of each size was painted
yellow. A force-torque transducer (Nano 17, ATI
Industrial Automation, Apex, NC) with a moveable
harness was mounted to the top of each object (Figure
1B), and participants used their preferred hand to lift
the objects with a precision grip.
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Figure 1. (A) The identically-weighted large and small cubes lifted in this study. Participants in the Same group lifted large and small
cubes of the same color, whereas participants in the Different group lifted large and small cubes that had different colors from one
another. (B) The handle used to lift the objects on each trial.

Procedure
For individuals in the Same group, the large and
small test cubes were the same color. For half of the
individuals, both objects were yellow, whereas for the
other half of the individuals, both objects were red.
Individuals in the Different group lifted objects that
were different colors. For half of the individuals in this
group, the small object was yellow and the large one
was red, whereas for the other half, the small object was
red and the large one was yellow. With their preferred
hand, participants lifted the small object followed by
the large object, repeating the alternating sequence for
a total of 30 lifts. The participants were instructed to
use a quick ‘‘hefting’’ motion to lift the objects rather
than a slow and careful lifting action, to ensure that the
measured lifting forces accurately reﬂected their expectations about object mass. After each lift participants were asked to rate the perceived heaviness of the
object using a 10-point rating scale where ‘‘1’’ was a
very light object and ‘‘10’’ was a very heavy object.

Data reduction and analysis
Grip forces (forces normal to the surface of the
handle) and load forces (forces tangential to the surface
of the handle) were recorded at 200 Hz and analyzed
ofﬂine using custom software. These force traces were
ﬁltered using a second-order, dual-pass Butterworth
ﬁlter with a low-pass cut-off of 14 Hz differentiated with
a 5-point central difference equation to yield grip force
rate (GFR) and load force rate (LFR). As ﬁngertip force
rates have been shown to rapidly adapt over repeated
trials, the peak values of the grip and load force rates on
the ﬁrst lift of each cube were taken as an index of
sensorimotor prediction (Buckingham & Goodale,
2013). First, separate 2 3 2 mixed-design analysis of
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variance (ANOVAs; within-subject factor: size, betweensubject factor: group) were conducted to examine the
effect of object size on ﬁngertip forces and perceptions of
heaviness. Then, to compare these respective effects
across groups, the difference between the initial force
rate used to lift the large and small cubes (hereafter
referred to as ‘‘sensorimotor prediction’’) was compared
between the Same and Different groups with an
independent samples t test. By contrast, as the perceptual SWI is stable and unchanging, we compared the
average ratings given to each cube as an index of the
SWI. As with the grip force rates, the small-large cube
difference score was compared across the Same and
Different groups with an independent samples t test.

Results
A preliminary examination of the grip and load force
rates for the lifts of both objects across trials showed that,
in terms of GFR, the Same group (Figure 2A) showed the
‘‘classic’’ pattern of data, with divergent force rates used
to grip the large and small objects on early trials, followed
by a rapid period of adaptation over the course of several
trials (Buckingham & Goodale, 2010b; Flanagan &
Beltzner, 2000). By contrast, participants in the Different
group appeared to be unaffected by size cues on early
trials, or across the entire experiment (Figure 2B). Neither
group showed an effect of object size in terms of their
LFRs (Figures 2C, D). Prior to the statistical analysis, we
removed four participants as outliers for having GFR
difference scores, which were greater than two standard
deviations above or below the mean. Thus, the ﬁnal
analyses were performed on 68 participants (34 in the
Same group, 34 in the Different group).
Due to a range of studies showing that color and
luminance can inﬂuence how heavy an object feels
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Figure 2. Grip force rates for the Same (A) and Different (B) groups, and load force rates for the Same (C) and Different (D) groups
plotted across all trials. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.

(Alexander & Shansky, 1976; Walker, Francis, &
Walker, 2010; Warden & Flynn, 1926), we ﬁrst examined
our implicit assumption that the color of the object being
lifted (i.e., independent from group) did not inﬂuence
individuals’ perceptions of heaviness. Indeed, when
averaging across the Same and Different groups and
comparing the different colors with independent samples
t tests, we found no inﬂuence of color on the perceived
heaviness of the small objects, t(64) ¼ 0.39, p ¼ 0.83, or
the large objects, t(64) ¼ 0.75, p ¼ 0.46. For the rest of the
analysis we collapse across the color groupings.
The omnibus analysis examining the effects of group
and object size on the perceptual ratings of heaviness
highlighted a main effect of size, F(1, 64) ¼ 145.95, p ,
0.001. Post hoc analyses showed that subjects in the
Same group reported that the small object felt heavier
than the large object, t(32) ¼ 8.7, p , 0.001.
Interestingly, subjects in the Different group also
reported that the small object felt heavier than the large
object, t(32) ¼ 8.4, p , 0.001. No interaction was
observed between size and group, F(1, 64) ¼ 0.01, p ¼
0.91, suggesting that individuals in the Same and
Different group experienced weight illusions of similar
magnitudes (Figure 3A, B).
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With the omnibus analysis for the ﬁrst-trial GFR, we
observed a main effect of size, F(1, 64) ¼ 12.6, p ,
0.005. Post hoc analyses showed that subjects in the
Same group applied signiﬁcantly more force to the
large objects than the small objects, t(32) ¼ 3.9, p ,
0.001, whereas subjects in the Different group applied
similar force to the large and small objects, t(32) ¼ 0.59,
p ¼ 0.56. Critically, a signiﬁcant interaction between
size and group was observed, F(1, 64) ¼ 8.2, p , 0.01,
indicating that participants in the Same group had their
GFRs inﬂuenced by object size to a greater degree than
participants in the Different group (Figure 3C, D).
In terms of ﬁrst-trial LFR, we observed no main
effect of object size, F(1, 64) ¼ 0.05, p ¼ 0.95, indicating
that, on average, size did not inﬂuence how individuals
lifted the objects (Figure 3E, F). This indication was
conﬁrmed by the lack of an interaction between size
and group, F(1, 64) ¼ 1.3, p ¼ 0.25.

Discussion
In the SWI, people judge small objects as feeling
heavier than large objects. This effect is thought to

Journal of Vision (2016) 16(3):25, 1–9

Buckingham, Goodale, White, & Westwood

6

Figure 3. (A) the average rating of heaviness given by subjects in each group for each object and (B) the difference between the
ratings given to the large and small objects (i.e., the magnitude of the perceptual illusion) compared across the groups. (C) the peak
GFR and (E) the peak LFR applied by subjects in each group on their first lift of each object, and (D) the difference between GFR and
(F) LFR applied to the large and small objects (i.e., the magnitude of the effect of object size on sensorimotor prediction) compared
across the groups. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.

come about because participants expect the large
objects to outweigh the small objects, due to the
positive correlation between size and volume in objects
outside of the lab. Of course, this correlation between
object volume and object mass is strongest within
objects of the same category (e.g., those that appear to
be made from the same material as one another). Thus,
large and small objects that have similar visual features
as one another should invoke stronger expectations of
heaviness, and thus elicit a far more robust weight
illusion than large and small objects that look
dissimilar. To test this hypothesis, we examined
perceptions of heaviness and sensorimotor prediction
in two groups of individuals. One group lifted
identically-weighted large and small cubes that were the
same color (i.e., objects from the same category),
whereas the other group lifted identically-weighted
large and small cubes that differed in color from one
another (i.e., appeared to be from different families of
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objects). Subjects lifting the same-colored objects
showed a clear inﬂuences of object size of sensorimotor
prediction (i.e., lifted the large object at higher rate of
force than the small object) and perception of heaviness
(i.e., experienced a robust SWI). By contrast, subjects
who lifted the different-colored objects showed a
different pattern of behavior. Because they had no
reason to assume the large object would outweigh the
small object, they initially lifted the objects with similar
rates of force, presumably reﬂecting the tendency to
apply forces in line with previous lifts when no salient
cues to object weight are available (Chouinard,
Leonard, & Paus, 2005; Loh, Kirsch, Rothwell, Lemon,
& Davare, 2010). Interestingly, in spite of their failure
to integrate size cues into their initial grip and lift
behavior, this group also experienced a robust SWI.
Indeed, the magnitude of the SWI when lifting across
category was almost identical to the SWI experienced
when lifting within category.
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The current work provides further support for the
well-established dissociation between sensorimotor prediction and perceptions of heaviness (Buckingham,
2014; Nowak, Glasauer, & Hermsdörfer, 2013). Although several studies have shown that ﬁngertip force
rates and perception of heaviness adapt at independent
rates from one another (Buckingham et al., 2009;
Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000; Grandy & Westwood, 2006),
it has been difﬁcult to rule out the possibility that the
sensorimotor mismatch during initial lifts could cause a
long-lasting perceptual illusion. Participants in a study
by Chang and colleagues did experience a robust SWI
without ﬁngertip force errors when lifting objects out of
their other hand (Chang, Flanagan, & Goodale, 2008),
but their task made it difﬁcult to rule out the possibility
of a sensorimotor mismatch during the initial placement
of each object. Here, participants in the Different group,
who lifted SWI-inducing objects that differed in color,
experienced a robust perceptual illusion without a single
instance of sensorimotor mismatch, conﬁrming that the
SWI cannot be due to ﬁngertip force application.
Indeed, the initial grip force rates of the Different group
highlights the stark speciﬁcity of the sensorimotor
system, such that color cues are sufﬁcient to break this
aspect of the sensorimotor system’s reliance on volume
cues. This surprising level of speciﬁcity mirrors ﬁndings
from motor learning studies where the dynamics of a
learned force ﬁeld impairs the learning rate of a second
force ﬁeld (e.g., Cothros, Wong, & Gribble, 2008).
However, these conclusions must be moderated by the
failure to ﬁnd any effect of volume cues on the load force
rates of the initial lifts, in either the Same or Different
group (Figures 2C, D). It is worth noting that the
current work is not the ﬁrst time that different effects
have been found in measures related to grip force than
load force (e.g., Green, Grierson, Dubrowski, &
Carnahan, 2010; Quaney, Rotella, Peterson, & Cole,
2003). We suspect that, in the context of the current
work, this discrepancy between grip and load force rates
reﬂects the fact that peak grip force rate is less closely
coupled to the actual mass of an object than peak load
force rate, making it a less biased index of how heavy an
object appears to be. Of course, many other studies do
typically ﬁnd sensorimotor prediction with parameters
related to load force, and it is still an open question the
degree to which grip and load parameters can be taken
as interchangeable measures and under which (if any)
circumstances they become uncoupled from one another.
The main goal of the current work was to better
understand the cause of the SWI. The ﬁndings from
this study are consistent with our earlier work showing
that apparent material cues do not inﬂuence the
magnitude of the SWI within individuals (Buckingham
& Goodale, 2013). Here we extend those ﬁndings by
showing directly, for the ﬁrst time, a full-strength SWI
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can be induced across object category. The ﬁndings
from the current work are difﬁcult to reconcile with the
idea that the SWI reﬂects a contrast with size-weight
mappings for individual families of objects (Flanagan
et al., 2008). Indeed, the ﬁndings from the current work
offer strong support for direct perception accounts of
the SWI, indicating that the identical-magnitude
illusion experienced by both groups must stem from a
property which is invariant across the groups (e.g.,
differences in density between the stimuli). However, a
signiﬁcant body of work does highlight an irrefutable
causal role for cognitive/perpetual expectations of
heaviness accounting for at least a portion of the
illusory heaviness difference experienced by those
lifting SWI-inducing stimuli (Buckingham & Goodale,
2010a; Flanagan et al., 2008). We suggest that our
ﬁndings support the idea that the cognitive/perceptual
expectations that drive the SWI are not speciﬁc to
object categories, but broadly generalizable across
categories of stimuli (in contrast to the speciﬁc,
nongeneralizable, and rapidly-adapting expectations
which must drive sensorimotor prediction when lifting
novel objects). Thus, our ﬁndings extend beyond the
conclusions of Flanagan et al. (2008) to suggest that,
rather than the SWI reﬂecting a deviation from the
average size-weight map for a particular family of
objects, it instead reﬂects a deviation from the sizeweight map of all objects with which one typically
interacts. Put another way, the SWI appears to be the
way in which our perceptual system highlights objects
that have an unusual density on average, rather than
speciﬁc to a particular category of objects.
To conclude, the current work conﬁrms that a fullstrength SWI can be induced across object category,
highlighting the powerful and distinct role that visual
size cues have on the human perceptual system. These
ﬁndings provide further support for the idea that, in
contrast to the speciﬁcity of human sensorimotor
control, human weight perception is inﬂuenced by a
particularly broad range of prior knowledge.
Keywords: object lifting, color, prior information
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